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“The country still faces a series of domestic and external challenges that remain 
significant hurdles on the path to great power status.”
India Held Back
Sumit GanGuly
How is India faring in its rise as a significant economic and diplomatic player in Asia and beyond? Certainly, reasons for optimism 
exist. In the late 1980s the country’s economy be-
gan to exceed its traditionally anemic “Hindu rate of 
growth” (a joke introduced by the late Indian econo-
mist, Raj Krishna, based on the economic concept of 
a “secular rate of growth”). Also, at the end of the cold 
war, India dispensed with its hoary commitment to 
nonalignment and its reflexive anti-Americanism. 
Finally, India disproved the polemical claim that, 
despite the country’s democracy and federalism, it 
would prove unable to contain ethnic separatism of 
the sort that was unleashed by the collapse of the 
poly-ethnic Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
India may yet emerge as a major power in Asia, 
with its influence extending well beyond its im-
mediate vicinity. However, as a quick survey of 
events in the past year demonstrates, the coun-
try still faces a series of domestic and external 
challenges that remain significant hurdles on the 
path to great power status. These challenges in-
clude an economic conundrum, fractious internal 
politics, growing governance problems, and dif-
ficulties both in tackling indigenous Islamic ex-
tremism and in improving relations with India’s 
ever-nettlesome neighbor, Pakistan.
While India has so far defied all doomsday sce-
narios constructed for it, its ability to deal with 
and indeed overcome its structural shortcomings 
ultimately will determine whether it can tran-
scend its role in South Asia and emerge as a global 
power of some consequence. 
perSiStent poverty
In late August 2008, the World Bank released a 
major study that provided some rather disturbing 
evidence about the persistence of absolute poverty 
in India. According to the report, the segment of 
the population living on less than $1.25 a day in 
all of South Asia had fallen from 60 percent to 40 
percent between 1981 and 2005. More specifically, 
within India, it had declined from 60 percent to 
42 percent during the same period. Yet, despite 
this progress, the study concluded that well over 
400 million Indians were still eking out a living 
on less than $1.25 a day in 2005.
Beyond this startling revelation, the Indian 
economy has been reeling this year from two im-
portant exogenous shocks—the high prices of 
both petroleum and food on the global market. Pe-
troleum products’ dramatic rise in cost has dealt a 
particularly hard blow to India’s economy. India’s 
gross domestic product, after achieving 9 percent 
growth in 2007, will grow by about 7 percent at 
best this year, according to even the most optimis-
tic forecasts. The greatest concern to most Indian 
policy makers, however, is not slowing growth 
but a sharp spike in inflation—which now hovers 
close to 13 percent.
These statistics should give the Indian govern-
ment pause, especially because they represent 
such a contrast to the bulk of the past decade, 
when the country has managed to grow by over 
8 percent annually. Given that India has steadily 
registered high growth rates since it embarked 
on economic liberalization following an unprece-
dented fiscal crisis in 1991, the country’s failure to 
make a greater dent in endemic poverty is some-
what puzzling.
Of course aggregate statistics, however compel-
ling, do not adequately capture India’s economic 
realities. Other evidence helps provide a different 
view of India’s economic future. For example, one of 
India’s largest industrial conglomerates, Tata, is on 
the verge of producing the world’s cheapest car, the 
Nano, which is expected to be priced at $2,500 and 
will meet the latest European emission standards. 
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Parts of India are emerging as manufacturing hubs 
for major automotive firms, especially Hyundai.
Moreover, India’s economic success is hard-
ly confined to the industrial sector. The coun-
try’s information technology sector continues 
to boom despite the current global economic 
downturn. According to the National Associa-
tion of Software and Services Companies (the 
apex organization of Indian information tech-
nology businesses), growth in India’s informa-
tion technology sector has been staggering over 
recent years. In 1998 the sector accounted for 1.2 
percent of India’s GDP. By 2007, this figure had 
reached 5.2 percent. The same organization pre-
dicts that the information technology sector, and 
related areas in business-process outsourcing, 
will contribute as much as $64 billion to India’s 
economy in 2008. 
The success of India’s information technology 
sector and its business-process outsourcing is not 
an entirely unknown phe-
nomenon to many Ameri-
cans. Indeed, this very 
success became fodder for 
populist outrage during the 
2004 presidential election 
when, for the first time, white 
collar industries were seeing 
jobs transferred to India and elsewhere from the 
United States. But not as well known is India’s con-
tinuing success in the pharmaceutical industry. In 
this sector, which initially focused on the produc-
tion of cheap generic drugs, some of the most suc-
cessful players are now investing in developing 
new drugs and are attracting the attention of for-
eign drug makers. In June of this year, for instance, 
India’s largest pharmaceutical company, Ranbaxy, 
sold a 70 percent stake in its equity to a Japanese 
firm, Daiichi Sankyo, for $4.6 billion.
India’s economic situation, in short, is complex 
and varied. The economy features sustained gen-
eral growth and innumerable success stories. Even 
so, there is no denying that compelling economic 
challenges still plague the nation. The evidence 
from India and elsewhere shows that posting high 
rates of economic growth and boasting highly 
successful economic sectors will not alone result 
in the reduction of endemic poverty. To make sig-
nificant strides in poverty reduction, India will 
need to go beyond market-oriented growth strate-
gies and devise imaginative public policies.
There are no panaceas for poverty. As argued 
by, among others, Amartya Sen, the Indian No-
bel laureate, the country must invest more in 
primary education and health care. Yet increased 
spending alone will not improve the lot of India’s 
poor. Currently, India spends 3 percent of GDP 
on education. However, for complex reasons, a 
disproportionate segment of this expenditure 
is directed toward higher education. Hence the 
quality of primary schooling in India remains 
quite uneven. Some of India’s states—especially 
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Himachal Pradesh—
have made primary education a priority, with 
impressive results. But a large number of other 
states have grossly neglected their public schools, 
with disastrous consequences. 
India spends close to 6 percent of its GDP on 
health care, but its public hospitals for the most 
part are in shambles. There is little or no over-
sight of public hospitals and maladministration is 
rampant. The country’s wealthy, of course, have 
opted out of the public health care system and en-
joy standards of health care 
comparable to those in the 
advanced industrial states.
India, however, cannot 
emerge as a great power 
with mere enclaves of excel-
lence amid vast swaths of 
grinding poverty, economic 
disparity, and social inequality. These internal 
cleavages invariably will contribute to political 
instability and thereby hobble India’s ambitions 
for major power status.
diSharmony ruleS
To a considerable degree, the economic hurdles 
that confront India result directly from the coun-
try’s fractious and increasingly coarse politics. 
The political spectrum in India ranges from two 
Communist parties—the Communist Party of In-
dia and the Communist Party of India (Marxist)—
which steadfastly refuse to countenance market-
oriented reforms at the national level, to parties 
that remain committed to such reforms, such as 
the middle-of-the road Congress and the right-of-
center Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
The width of the political spectrum and the 
virtual absence of one-party dominance in India’s 
parliament for over two decades have meant that 
the forging of a political consensus on many is-
sues of national significance can easily be held 
hostage to either parochial political or rigidly 
ideological concerns. Such a situation confront-
ed the Indian polity in July this year when the 
Some Indian political analysts 
are already predicting the 
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Communists and their allies in the parliament 
withdrew support for the Congress-led regime 
of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh over the 
government’s pursuit of a major civilian nuclear 
agreement with the United States.
This agreement, which will allow India to par-
ticipate in normal global nuclear commerce, won 
the approval of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in September. The US Congress granted its 
imprimatur to the deal on October 1. India until 
now has been excluded from nuclear energy com-
merce because of its unwillingness to sign the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and because of 
its pursuit of nuclear weapons outside the ambit 
of the global nonproliferation regime. Under the 
terms of the pact, India has agreed to separate its 
nuclear establishment into two segments. Four-
teen of its existing power reactors will be brought 
under International Atomic Energy Agency safe-
guards while another eight, presumably connected 
to India’s nuclear weapons program, will remain 
off limits. Over time, the agreement should make 
a meaningful contribution to meeting India’s bur-
geoning energy needs while reducing the coun-
try’s acute dependence on imported petroleum 
products and fossil fuels.
The Communists and their allies opposed the 
agreement strictly on ideological grounds. Indeed, 
one prominent Communist leader, Prakash Karat, 
made no secret of the fact that his hostility toward 
the deal was based on his belief that it would con-
tribute to greater Indo-US diplomatic amity. The 
BJP, for its part, displayed political opportunism 
in its crassest form. When in power in the early 
part of this decade, the party was instrumental in 
dramatically improving relations with the United 
States and had even initiated preliminary negotia-
tions on the civilian nuclear agreement. However, 
when Prime Minister Singh decided to send the 
carefully negotiated agreement to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group for its approval, the Communists, 
a group of small parties allied with them, and the 
BJP chose to attack the deal with vigor in the hope 
of bringing the government down and hastening 
new national elections.
In the end, though the government was hit 
with unproven, scurrilous allegations of bribing 
key parliamentary supporters during negotiations 
over the pact (though some overt political horse-
trading certainly occurred), the Singh adminis-
tration prevailed. It did not lose its parliamentary 
majority, and it managed to send the agreement 
off to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
Nevertheless, the episode again underscored 
the ideological rigidity and political crassness 
that have come to characterize Indian politics. 
The outrageous behavior of parties at the two ex-
tremes of the political spectrum showed that even 
those well-schooled in the craft of parliamentary 
democracy were willing to violate one of its most 
fundamental and cherished tenets, the principle 
of loyal opposition. And this is not the first occa-
sion when the BJP has resorted to such crude par-
liamentary tactics. Shortly after its electoral defeat 
in the national elections of 2004, the leadership of 
the BJP often resorted to obstreperous behavior to 
impede routine parliamentary proceedings.
These sorts of political tactics, aggravating In-
dia’s ideological, regional, and personal divides, 
represent a serious impediment to the forging of 
a consensus on policies that would promote and 
sustain economic growth while also aiming at 
poverty reduction.
Stubborn inSurgenCieS
Tragically, as the Singh government focused its 
energies on fending off the BJP’s attacks and the 
Communists’ attempts to unseat it over the nu-
clear deal, long-simmering discontent within the 
majority Muslim population in the disputed state 
of Jammu and Kashmir flared up once again in 
July. The Indian-controlled portion of this state 
has been the site of an ethno-religious insurgency 
since 1989. The insurgency had its origins in the 
exigencies of domestic Indian politics. However, 
once the insurgency erupted, significant Pakistani 
support for and involvement in it expanded its 
scope and increased its duration. In recent years, 
an Indian counterinsurgency strategy combining 
fierce repression with political concessions had 
managed to restore a large degree of normalcy. 
Nevertheless, a reservoir of disaffection from the 
Indian state remained in the region. 
The immediate precipitant of this summer’s cri-
sis was a decision by the coalition government in 
the state to hand over some 100 acres of publicly 
owned land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board, a 
quasi-public body that oversees annual Hindu pil-
grimages to a prominent Himalayan shrine. Once 
the government had announced its decision to 
build shelters for the Hindu pilgrims on the land, 
Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a local Islamist leader with 
pronounced pro-Pakistani sentiments, mobilized 
his followers, claiming that the decision to hand 
over the land was part of an unfolding and sinister 
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The Islamist’s claims were entirely menda-
cious. However, his inflammatory rhetoric fired 
the popular imagination of young Kashmiris 
who harbor considerable resentment against the 
Indian state for the dislocations they have expe-
rienced during the insurgency of the past two 
decades. Soon public demonstrations started to 
rock the Kashmir valley. Faced with this appar-
ent groundswell of discontent, one of the part-
ners in the coalition regime, the Peoples’ Demo-
cratic Party, abruptly withdrew its support for 
the land transfer. But the Congress Party refused 
to go along to take the same step.
In late July the regional government collapsed. 
India’s central government took over the affairs 
of the state, also replacing the governor. The new 
governor, a highly respected former bureaucrat, 
Narendra Nath Vohra, in an attempt to assuage 
the feelings of the aggrieved Muslim population, 
rescinded the land transfer. His decision, howev-
er, led Hindu chauvinists in Jammu, the southern 
part of the state, to start a violent agitation. As 
matters threatened to spin completely out of con-
trol, the central government intervened again and 
sought to address the grievances of both constitu-
encies. Negotiations proved successful in contain-
ing the agitation in Jammu, but violent demon-
strations persisted in the Kashmir valley.
Unfortunately, the renewed agitation and very 
possibly a recrudescence of the insurgency in 
Kashmir are not the only challenges to authority 
that face the Indian state today. At least two other 
sources of violent discontent stalk the land. The 
first is a resurgence of the Naxalite movement. 
This movement had its origins among a group of 
neophyte Maoist guerrillas in the state of West 
Bengal in the late 1960s. They had started their 
violent agitation in the village of Naxalbari, from 
which the movement derives its name. By the early 
1970s, largely through a strategy of harsh repres-
sion, the Indian state had managed to effectively 
suppress the movement. 
To the dismay and shock of India’s policy mak-
ers, the Naxalite menace has seen a dramatic re-
surgence. In 2006 as many as 165 districts in 14 
states were facing periodic attacks from Naxalite 
guerrillas. The central government, while it has 
recognized the problem, has yet to devise a coor-
dinated strategy to deal with this renewed threat 
to public order and wellbeing. To a large extent, 
India’s federal structure hobbles the development 
of a uniform, nationwide strategy to tackle this 
problem. Unless law and order break down almost 
completely, the central government cannot inter-
vene in the day-to-day law-and-order problems of 
particular states. Nor can the central government 
send in paramilitary forces without the express 
invitation and consent of state governments. 
Moreover, the attempts by some states to con-
front the problem have actually worsened matters. 
In the state of Chhattisgarh, for example, authori-
ties have created a village-based vigilante orga-
nization, the Salwa Judum (literally “peace mis-
sion”). This entity—composed of villagers armed 
with crude weaponry and lacking in training, or-
ganization, and control—has engaged in mayhem 
while attempting to counter the Naxalites. In the 
process, far from containing the Naxalite threat, 
the Salwa Judum may have contributed to the 
swelling of the rebels’ ranks. 
What explains the seemingly abrupt resurgence 
of this movement? There are no clear-cut answers. 
Popular accounts tend to emphasize the growing 
impact of India’s fitful embrace of a more market-
oriented economic development strategy and the 
concomitant inequalities that it has helped gen-
erate. This argument, though seemingly persua-
sive, is not entirely satisfactory because substan-
tial economic inequity has been a constant of the 
Indian socioeconomic landscape since indepen-
dence. Even so, economic disparities—combined 
with growing awareness of them and mobilization 
based on those grievances—certainly help to ex-
plain the return of the Naxalites. The sources of 
this malady in any case need to be carefully iden-
tified as India’s central government and constitu-
ent states seek to devise strategies to contain and 
suppress it.
homegrown terroriStS
The other critical security threat confront-
ing the Indian state is the rise of homegrown 
Islamic extremism. The sources of this threat 
are complex but more readily explicable than 
the Naxalite menace. During this past year, In-
dia has faced a spate of bombings in major cities 
including Jaipur in May and Ahmedabad in July. 
A little-known organization, the Indian Muja-
hideen—widely believed to be linked with the 
banned Students Islamic Movement of India—
has claimed responsibility for some of these 
bomb attacks. A series of five coordinated bomb-
ings in New Delhi on September 13, 2008, rep-
resented perhaps the most daring and brazen of 
these attacks, even though the loss of life was not 
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Muslims, who constitute India’s largest mi-
nority, do not amount to a cultural or social 
monolith. Social class, sect, language, and re-
gional affiliations divide them. However, the rise 
of a form of Hindu jingoism has contributed to a 
sense of siege among the Muslim community at 
large. Worse still, a pogrom against various Mus-
lim communities in the western state of Gujarat 
in 2002, and a failure to prosecute its perpetra-
tors, helped to radicalize a segment of young 
Muslim men. 
Indian intelligence organizations now claim 
that many of these disaffected men have been 
trained in Bangladesh and Pakistan to carry out 
acts of mayhem, sabotage, and terror in India. It is 
impossible to confirm the veracity of these claims. 
However, circumstantial evidence does suggest 
that such external involvement in and support for 
terrorism is not beyond the realm of possibility. 
Bangladesh and especially Pakistan both have a 
record of supporting vari-
ous dissident and insurgent 
movements in India. 
As a consequence of the 
rise of a virulent Hindu na-
tionalist movement since the 
1980s, Muslim communi-
ties across India have been 
the objects of both increased opprobrium and 
violence. Worse still, a government-commissioned 
analysis of the status of Muslims in India, the Jus-
tice Rajinder Sachar Commission Report of 2006, 
provides a disturbing portrait of the Muslim com-
munity’s poor representation in the realm of gov-
ernment employment. For example, even though 
Muslims comprise about 13 percent of India’s pop-
ulation, a mere 3 percent can be found in the elite 
Indian administrative service, 1.8 percent in the 
exclusive Indian foreign service, and 4 percent in 
the powerful Indian police service.
Significantly lower educational attainments 
among Muslims as a whole explain, in consider-
able part, their failure to enter these critical gov-
ernmental bodies. But how the Indian state seeks 
to redress these significant disparities in the years 
ahead will in large measure shape the evolution 
of the Muslim community’s ties and loyalties to 
the Indian state. In turn, influential and success-
ful members of the Muslim community must also 
suggest possible strategies for addressing the com-
munity’s needs, for promoting social and cultural 
reform, and for eschewing violence. An absence 
of such leadership will inevitably provide politi-
cal fodder to Hindu zealots who whip up populist 
hatred against Muslims.
 a fraught relationShip
In addition to the domestic troubles stemming 
from economic inequity, political squabbling, and 
ethno-religious tensions, India faces a very serious 
challenge in its relations with an increasingly un-
stable neighbor, Pakistan. Despite Pakistan’s tenu-
ous transition to democracy in February of this 
year, the problems accumulated from years of au-
thoritarian misrule and chicanery still plague the 
country. Most importantly, despite the resignation 
of General Pervez Musharraf from the presidency 
in August, the military in Pakistan remains pri-
mus inter pares. It is far from clear that President 
Asif Ali Zardari and the minority regime of the 
Pakistan People’s Party in parliament will be able 
to curb drastically the substantial powers of the 
military establishment any time soon. 
And as long as the Paki-
stani military remains an 
important force in the coun-
try’s political order, it will be 
exceedingly difficult for any 
civilian regime to improve 
relations with India. This 
was amply demonstrated in 
July when members of the reconstituted Taliban 
carried out a suicide bomb attack on the Indian 
embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Despite official 
denials from Pakistan, both India and the United 
States have publicly implicated Pakistan’s powerful 
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate in planning 
and masterminding this attack. Not surprisingly, 
the fitful bilateral peace process between India and 
Pakistan, the so-called “composite dialogue” that 
began in 2004, is now in considerable jeopardy.
Given Pakistan’s present internal political dis-
array, the recent upheaval in Indian-controlled 
Kashmir, and the upcoming elections in India 
next year, it is most unlikely that any tangible 
progress will be made soon in Indo-Pakistani re-
lations. Even if another meeting within the frame-
work of the composite dialogue is held this year, 
the ensuing discussions will be little more than 
perfunctory.
over the horizon
The Singh regime’s inability to forestall the 
dramatic bomb blasts in Jaipur, Ahmedabad, and 
New Delhi; its slow and clumsy response to the 
widespread disturbances in Jammu and Kashmir; 
Ideological rigidity and political 
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its failure swiftly to contain spiraling inflation: 
All this in combination with the anti-incumbency 
propensities of the Indian voter bodes ill for the 
present government in the national elections due 
in 2009. Unless in the next several months the 
administration can start addressing critical ques-
tions of both internal security and economic sta-
bility, its future in the next elections is virtually 
foreordained. Some Indian political analysts are 
already predicting the demise of the Singh regime 
based on its failure to pre-
vent the multiple bombings 
in the nation’s capital. 
In any case, it is easy to 
anticipate how the principal 
opposition party, the BJP, will 
campaign. It will unfailingly 
exploit the present adminis-
tration’s very real shortcomings and insist that it 
will tackle India’s challenges with more alacrity 
and efficacy. And the BJP is not the only bête noire 
that the Congress Party faces in the next elec-
tions. In the large, poor, populous state of Uttar 
Pradesh, the current lower-caste chief minister, 
Kumari Mayawati, has already made clear her 
national ambitions. Whether she will be able to 
mobilize significant support beyond her political 
base in her home state and northern India remains 
an open question.
More to the point, even if she and her Bahu-
jan Samaj Party were to win a substantial num-
ber of parliamentary seats, they would still have 
to forge a coalition with other political parties 
to form a government. Such a regime would in-
evitably prove unstable, as regional, ideologi-
cal, and personal differences would soon come 
to the fore and threaten any coalition. While 
India has had some expe-
rience with coalition gov-
ernments, none has been 
known for its longevity or 
stability.
As the year nears its end, 
the Indian polity, though not 
facing any threat to its vi-
ability, nevertheless confronts a range of domestic 
and external challenges that will severely tax the 
resources of the next regime in office. So long as 
India remains weighed down by its various bur-
dens—and lacks a national consensus on critical 
policies pertaining to economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, secularism, and relations with conten-
tious neighbors—it inevitably will fail to realize 
its potential for great power status. ■
The country’s failure to make a 
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